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ABSTRACT
strategic sealift, the movement of cargo in support of
deployed troops in an international conflict, relies
primarily on a national asset---a National Defense Reserve
Force, administered by MARAD, and a commercial asset---the
us Merchant Marine. The decline of the Merchant Marine,
along with the attendant decline and unmanageable nature of
MARAD-administered forces, made sealift (which was once
carried out simply by purchasing space on us carriers) the
limiting factor in the successful execution of Operations
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. This decline is documented in a
literature review. A nine case analysis of sealift
performance, examining three scenarios at three times, is
then presented. The analysis yields mixed results . In some
cases sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not. The
substandard cases point to areas ripe for changes in policy
or procurement.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Problem Statement
Shipping resources in Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT
STORM (hereafter referred to as DS/DS) proved unequal to
national emergency requirements that were legislatively
mandated and operationally set by the Department of Defense
(DoD). DESERT SHIELD was plagued with a situation where
actual deliveries of supplies, coordinated primarily by the
Navy's Military Sealift Command (one of the three arms of a
Transportation Command tasked with providing air, land and
sea transportation to meet national security objectives),
lagged behind Central Command requirements. Due to the
absence of hostilities during the deployment, the
Transportation Command had more than five months to overcome
initial problems and deliver the needed supplies before
DESERT STORM began. The Transportation Command's support of
the deployment needs of the Central Command was not
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accomplished however, as rapidly, efficiently, and
effectively as intended (GAO, 1992). Most of the deficiency
in support can be attributed to large-scale shortcomings in
non-DoD controlled shipping assets, specifically in the
Maritime Administration (MARAD)-administered National
Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) and US Merchant Marine, with
respect to both ships and manning.
Three years later, with the possibility of major
conflict looming as it always does, especially on the
distant Korean Peninsula, the US has not made improvements
in non-DoD shipping significant enough to overcome the
deficiencies. The military's regional commanders say
shortages of sealift make academic the ongoing debate over
the size of the force needed to win two wars at once.
Today's military can barely move enough equipment to conduct
a humanitarian operation and training exercise
simultaneously (Matthews, 1994). To deploy initial forces
to two regional conflicts at once would require moving as
much cargo in two months as was moved during the first six
months of Operation DESERT STORM (Maze, 1994). Clearly, the
US may still be unable to provide sealift for only one war.
In the face of this situation, DoD has embarked on what many
feel is an ill-fated acquisition path that, if carried out,
would place all sealift assets under its ownership, exposing
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it to expenses that may not be satisfied given the
volatility of defense budgets.
Meanwhile, the Merchant Marine continues a precipitous
decline that began in the early 1950s. It may soon join the
ranks of great American industries that have gone by the
wayside (Misch, 1993). Legislation initiated in the 102nd
Congress to strengthen maritime security aspects of the
Merchant Marine was not considered. More legislation has
been introduced in the 103rd Congress . Even if passed, it
will not do much. Its provisions are on a small scale
compared with past efforts in support of the US Merchant
Marine.
Concurrently, the other leg of non-DoD shipping, the
MARAD-supplied National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF), faces
problems of similar gravity. The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ,
the operational arm of the NDRF, enjoyed a year of full
funding in the wake of the Gulf War. still, funding was cut
again in Fiscal Year (FY) 1993 as more assets were devoted
to prepositioned shipping.
The decline of the Merchant Marine and problems with
MARAD-administered shipping has risen to crisis proportions.
The individual declines are very much intertwined. They are
gradual and ongoing. Finally, they are part of a larger
trend that points away from an earlier heyday of maritime
3
supremacy. Taken together, these developments pose a
serious threat to national security.
Hypothesis
It is hypothesized that this nation is unable to
provide acceptable sealift for a wide range of conceivable
national emergencies. This is due mainly to deficiencies in
the two non-DOD controlled shipping assets---MARAD-
controlled National Defense Reserve Forces, and US Merchant
Marine Shipping. These are, by law, the most significant
source of strategic sealift.
Methodology
This study is accomplished in two steps, using
qualitative and quantitative methods, respectively. In the
first step, the literature is reviewed to extract
qualitative, or anecdotal, deficiencies in sealift. This
step is a necessary foundation for the second, or
quantitative step that examines sealift shortfalls. The
first step frames the problem and adds clarity to the
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assumptions and initial conditions in the analysis performed
in step two. For instance, in step two it is assumed that
the reduction in US-flagged ships and merchant seamen will
lead to a situation where no ocean-going merchant vessels
will be available for sealift by the end of the century. In
the second step, the operational case in DS!DS is examined
against the normative case---what should have happened in
DS!DS based on statutory directives and the explicit
principles of the National Security Sealift Policy (Pena,
1993), and a future case---what sealift capability can be
expected based on current acquisition plans and directives.
The future case, an application of the analysis to the year
1999, is included in order to frame current developments and
policy-making with respect to improvements that can be made.
Each of these three cases is subject to a test at three
times to yield a total of nine cases .
This study is based on four primary assumptions. Each
is reasonable. Each is essential to the validity of the
study.
First, the Gulf War provides a good model for massive
strategic sealift. It was the largest mobilization of
troops since the Vietnam War and the most concentrated
sealift operation since World War II (Martinez, 1992). This
assumption takes into account the fact that DS!DS was not a
5
worst-case scenario. It had massive yet relatively benign
operational requirements. Shortages in sealift did not
result in the loss of American lives. This was due to the
favorable factors present in the sealift operation. These
included:
-allied control of air and shipping lanes.
-six months, unopposed, to build an offensive
inventory.
-access to modern port facilities.
-no battle damage to ports or attrition of shipping.
-shipyards with drydocks in the area.
-ample supplies of fuel in the area.
-near unanimous support for the effort, making foreign
flagged ships and crews readily available.
-the opportunity to phase activation of RRF vessels,
mitigating difficulties in repairing, crewing, and
activating vessels (Martinez, 1992).
The second assumption is that sealift operations since
DS/DS have been on too small a scale to evaluate the overall
apparatus effectively. The operation in Somalia fits this
category. Operation RESTORE HOPE utilized but a small
fraction of the sealift inventory.
Third, non-DoD sealift assets have not changed
considerably in the three years since the Gulf War. No
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sweeping legislative changes have occurred, procurement
efforts in the last three years, excepting a few ships and
charter arrangements, have not yet come to fruition and
regardless have focused only on surge-shipping assets that
will come on line mid-decade, and finally, the US Merchant
Marine continues its decline.
Fourth, the abundance of petroleum in the operating
area makes analysis of petroleum shipments, even though they
exceeded cargo shipments on a tonnage basis, of little use.
Shipments of fuel on tankers represent a very small fraction
of that used in the theater during DS/DS. On the other
hand, general cargo ships transported combat, combat
support (CS), and combat systems support (CSS) equipment, as
well as sustainment cargo. As much as 95 % of these types of
cargo must be moved by sea (Goodhue, 1993). Due to this
disparity, the study disregards all shipments of petroleum
and voyages by tankers.
Significance
A large body of literature has been devoted to broader
issues related to the context of this study. These include
the decline of the US Merchant Marine, policy deficiencies
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within the USDOT, and the lack of US capability to deploy
large forces to "hot-spots," now that the cold war is over
and extensive forward deployment has been abandoned.
Comparatively little attention has been given to how the
decline in the US Merchant Marine, and a maritime auxiliary,
MARAD, has affected parameters outside of employment or
economic strength.
The nine cases this study examines build on an
extremely detailed and in-depth two-case study of
operational sealift completed by Shuford (1990). That study
was completed in the fall of 1990, before the halfway point
of Desert Shield. Thus, it was only able to examine surge
shipping for the operation. Not surprisingly, it revealed
across the board shortages. The study, along with the data
on which it was based, are not for public distribution.
Still, enough data exist in the public literature to perform
a quantitative analysis that is not excessively disjunctive.
This study attempts to do just that. It complements the
analysis with a literature review that tries to make sense
of diverse, and often parochial, literature that is
tangential to the subject at hand.
This study is significant in that it documents how two
organizations, MARAD and the US Merchant Marine, that exist
mainly for the interest of marine commerce, can in their
decline profoundly affect this nation's most basic
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requirement---security. It frames this problem with respect
to an actual occurrence (the results of which at least
approximate current capability). This allows conclusions to
be inferred that might rectify problems with and among the
myriad entities involved in national defense, government,
and industry, toward an end result---satisfactory shipping
in support of US forces in conflict. These conclusions will
show the utility in fixing current deficiencies through
revitalization of the commercial sector (by demonstrating
the futility in purchasing an entire sealift fleet), and
point to improvements in MARAD necessary to that
revitalization.
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CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW
History
In the mid-1970s, with the drawdown of the military and
the advent of the Rapid Deployment Force, the nascent stages
of a new military strategy emerged. This strategy shunned
exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons and large forward-
deployed forces in favor of responsiveness. As times
changed, and the need to project forces rapidly gained
urgency, strategic mobility, the key to reinforcement,
became the cornerstone of the National Military Strategy
(Pasquarette and Foster, 1994). Thus, in the 1980s, the US
Navy added sealift and its support as a fundamental mission
to its other three: strategic nuclear deterrence, protecting
the sea lines of communication, and power projection.
The new strategy came at an unfortunate time with
respect to trends in the US Merchant Marine. The US
Merchant Marine has steadily declined from its all time high
10
at the end of WWII. In the 1950s and 1960s, during the
conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, it still comprised over a
thousand ships and scores of commercial operators. This
climate made it possible for the US Merchant Marine alone to
meet sealift requirements (Flyntz, 1992). By 1970, however,
the decline was in full swing. US-flagged market share had
been reduced eightfold, from .42.6% of the world market to a
mere 5.3 % (Figure 1). It was no longer possible to meet the
initial requirements of sealift by acquiring commercial
space. For this reason, the RRF was developed in 1976
(Joint DoD/DOT Ready Reserve Force Working Group (RRFWG),
1991) .
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FIGURE 1: DECLINE OF THE US MERCHANT MARINE
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Despite the establishment of the RRF, studies concluded
more strategic lift would be required in a host of war-gamed
scenarios within the range of possibility. A DoD sealift
study revealed significant shortages in sealift. Its
results mandated a new policy formulation in which the US
would seek commitments from allied shipping in times of
national emergency. This policy was the first of its kind.
Later, the Commission on Merchant Marine and Defense
identified large shortfalls in ships and seagoing labor.
Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Revised
Intertheater Mobility Study that looked at sealift together
with airlift and prepositioned assets. It revealed
shortfalls so great that the DoD never approved the results.
After these reports, President Bush approved a national
sealift policy in 1989 (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
The policy was sorely tested in 1990 after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. This test revealed many deficiencies.
The US found it did not have the ability to deliver the
cornerstone of a rapidly deployed force, that is, a heavy
division with its gear, in three weeks. Delivery of combat
and support forces did not meet the expectations of the
operational commanders. More troublesome, many weaknesses
identified in the studies of the 1980s were only partially
addressed.
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Still, the weaknesses were revealed at small cost as
the circumstances of the operation allowed shortfalls in us
sealift. An international coalition in line with us
interests allowed easy access to foreign shipping assets.
This mitigated the suboptimum performance of the US-flagged
merchant fleet and the incomplete (and in the cases of many
ships, late) activation of the RRF. Additionally, the RRF
performance, although poor from the viewpoint of the field
commander, proved acceptable given the long delay between
deployment in DESERT SHIELD and combat in DESERT STORM
(Gibson and Shuford, 1991). Indeed, the performance of
sealift in DS/DS is characterized as excellent in government
reports by many agencies involved in its execution.
However, after the war, some assessments of sealift
capability were harsh in media and military circles. In the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman's (JCSC) 1991 Joint Military
Net Assessment, the JCSC said that in the early weeks of a
short-warning war in Southwest Asia, or in two simultaneous
regional conflicts, "shortages will exist in airlift,
sealift, or pre-positioned supplies [that could have]
potentially grave consequences" (Powell, 1991).
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Desert Shield/Desert Storm
Most Americans would characterize the Persian Gulf War
as a success. The United States forged a broad coalition
against the aggressor, defeated her with a minimum of
casualties, and brokered a settlement that stabilized the
area, at least for the time being. The outcome was no doubt
a factor in the world's oil surplus. Oil costs less now
than it did before the war. More important, however, is the
fact that DS/DS tested American forces in a scenario that
will likely be replayed in the future. It was a crisis that
required mobile contingency forces to move quickly and on
short notice. For precisely this reason, significant
lessons were learned. Of these lessons learned, a prime one
is that sealift, the movement of cargo in national
emergencies to deploy armed forces, was not up to the
standards used to formulate national military policy. This
was mainly due to deficiencies in shipping and manning with
respect to non-DoD assets . These deficiencies are
outgrowths of spectra of misguided maritime and defense
policies and an overall trend away from maritime supremacy.
The shortfalls are split into two areas. The first
expresses how the decline of the Merchant Marine has
adversely affected the nation's ability to conduct sealift.
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This decline has been precipitated by policy shifts that
assume availability of allied shipping in conflicts,
legislation that removed long standing subsidies and
incentives, and manning problems. The second problem is in
the arena of sealift programs. The success of DoD-
controlled assets such as the twenty-five Maritime and
Afloat Prepositioned Ships (MPS/APS) and nearly acceptable
performance of the eight MSC-controlled fast-sealift ships
(FSSs) are in stark contrast to the problematic National
Defense Reserve Force (NDRF). The NDRF consists of a fast-
sealift component, Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships
designated ROS-4 on four-day recall or RRF-5 ships on five-
day recall, the remainder of the RRF ships, which round out
MARAD's surge shipping assets, on ten or twenty-day recall,
and the Inactive Reserve Force (IRF), which theoretically
exists to support the highest levels of mobilization.
These areas, the decline of the Merchant Marine and
problems with MARAD-administered assets, overlap when
problems with fleet composition and readiness are examined
with respect to the types of ships that supply contingency
forces. These ships include unitized general cargo ships---
Roll-on Roll-off ships (RO/RO), barge ships (LASH/SEABEE)
and container ships (LO/LO)---breakbulk ships, tankers, and
possibly, troopships.
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There was very little volunteer foreign shipping in
DS/DS although the allied coalition consisted mainly of oil
importers who relied heavily on Persian Gulf oil exports.
However, most of MSC's initial charters were foreign-
flagged. After the surge portion of DESERT SHIELD, over
half of the seventy-three ships chartered were from foreign
fleets (Gibson and Shuford, 1991). By the end of DS/DS, the
US had hired 165 ships from twenty-seven countries. These
were militarily useful vessels not in the US inventory.
Some ships came at exorbitant rates. For example, a
Norwegian RO/RO was chartered at a rate of $16,000 a day,
double its normal price (Gourdin and Clarke, 1992). Other
ships came with political strings attached. This was
undoubtedly the case with ships supplied from Japan and the
Soviet Union (Ackley, 1992). Among these charters, one
foreign-flagged ship under MSC's control did not go into the
Gulf and other ships slowed en route (Donovan, 1992) . More
troublesome, DS/DS represented ideal conditions, where a
broad coalition left Iraq without maritime allies. This
underscored the inadequacy of US-flagged sealift assets
overall and displayed the effect on national security of the
decline in the US Merchant Marine given the DoD assumption
that foreign flagged vessels are reliable sources of
sealift.
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The decline of the Merchant Marine, and the attendant
loss of Merchant Mariners, has greatly affected sealift
readiness. Limited operations diminished the employment
pool of trained mariners to draw upon in DS/DS to 11,000
personnel, down 60 % since 1970. Despite the existence of a
federal Merchant Marine Academy, six state Merchant Marine
Academies, and seventeen Merchant Marine training
facilities, as US-flagged merchant shipping declines, fewer
jobs become available. Hence graduates must change careers.
Their licenses expire. Their desire to return to sea is low
(Ackley, 1992). The bottom line is that the shortage of
merchant mariners is not due to a lack of sailors, but
rather, a lack of ships (Donovan, 1991). Lastly, the
merchant mariner is not protected like his seagoing navy
counterpart. Without programs for merchant mariners similar
to those available to naval reservists, i.e., salary
protection and reemployment rights, manning expectations can
not be fully met (Donovan, 1992).
Another major problem is the effect the timing of
activations has on manning pools. DS/DS showed that while
it is easy to produce one crew to man one ship, it is
something entirely different to produce seventy crews in
five days. Initial obligations for sealift in DESERT SHIELD
required approximately fourteen-hundred mariners for the
first 44 ships from August 10 to September 22 (Flyntz,
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1992). The immediacy of the project stretched the pool of
merchant mariners considerably. Mariners in their seventies
(some sources report eighties) deployed on sealift missions
as the union halls were scraped to the bone.
The manning shortage should not have been unexpected.
From its inception, the RRF was never exercised in a
meaningful manner. As a result, crew availability was never
fully validated. Examining test activations prior to DS/DS
shows cases where the same crew members participated. Test
call-ups resulted in predictable affirmative responses from
merchant mariners as to their availability. When DS/DS
materialized, there was naturally far less willingness among
those same merchant mariners to give up current employment
or the opportunity for better employment in order to take an
arduous, and historically dangerous, job of unknown duration
(FI yn t z , 1992).
Government sealift can be split into three categories,
prepositioned shipping, MSC fast-sealift shipping, and the
NDRF. DS/DS showed the least troublesome of these
categories was DoD-controlled prepositioned shipping (APS
and MPS). Among the remainder, the highest priority vessels
or fast-sealift ships performed acceptably but not up to
activation requirements specified in MARAD and MSC
directives. More important, DS/DS brought up serious
questions as to the disposition and deployment of the
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remainder of the NDRF, consisting of RRF ships, maintained
to meet surge sealift requirements, and IRF ships.
In DS!DS, the prepositioned squadrons did exceptionally
well. Two of the three MPSs, which supply Marine
Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs), the force contingents often
sent first in military deployments, were ordered to sail on
August 7, 1990. Each squadron put to sea on the August 8,
and off-loaded in Saudi Arabia on August 16, where the First
and Seventh MEBs, airlifted in, met their gear (Donovan,
1992). Eight of the Twelve APS ships, long-term MSC
charters that supply Army and Air Force elements, had off-
loaded their equipment within a week of being ordered to
sail. The successful operation of these ships resulted in
the deployment of two MEBs, and the prepositioning of
significant amounts of Army and Air Force Cargo. This, in
addition to light infantry elements of the 82nd Airborne and
air support from two aircraft carriers, may have prevented
an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia early in DESERT SHIELD.
The fact that an early invasion did not take place was
fortunate for allied forces, because other sealift support
arrived late to varying degrees.
The MSC's FSSs, priority vessels that are maintained in
a four-day readiness state by merchant mariners under
contract, deployed on average in six days for DESERT SHIELD
(Gibson and Shuford, 1991). This was unacceptable given the
20
urgent nature of the supply effort. Nonetheless, the FSSs
performed better than the RRF.
During DS/DS, the RRF, maintained in a five, ten, or
twenty day readiness status, experienced scores of
activation problems. In DESERT SHIELD, of the seventeen RRF
ships in a five-day readiness status initially requested,
only three were provided in the required five-day response
time (Navy News, 1990). Less than one-third of the
activated ships reached their designated loading ports on
time. The commander of the MSC, Admiral Donovan, felt the
system had false expectations of the ability to break out
many RRF ships in five days. Some ships had been idle,
along with their engineering plants, for up to thirteen
years (Donovan, 1992). As such, their steam-driven
propulsion plants were prone to leaks from dried-out packing
in valves and pumps, and breakage associated with the
mechanical stresses of plant heat-up. Of the ninety-six
ships in the RRF at the time of DS/DS, only forty-four were
activated in the surge portion of the conflict. As other
assets, i.e., foreign-flagged vessels, were used in the RRF
activation period, one could make the case that some ships
in the RRF were unusable (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
Seventy-nine of the RRF vessels did eventually deploy during
DS/DS (Card, 1992b), but a significant portion, nearly one
in five, did not. This lack of activation may be explained
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to some extent by a smaller need for tankers and break-bulk
ships, compared to a great need for RO/ROs in the conflict.
But clearly, some ships deferred action on known material
deficiencies until activation was required. This led to
documented delays in activating RRF vessels, or prevented
activation altogether.
DS/DS revealed inadequacies in the composition of ships
in the nation's RRF. The most glaring of these shortfalls
was the lack of Roll-on/Roll-off (RO/RO) shipping in the
war. Tanks, personnel carriers, mortar emplacements and the
like are best transported on decks where they can be rolled
on and shipped, then rolled off and deployed. At the time
all of the RO/ROs in the RRF were called to action, less
than one-third of the breakbulk ships and less than one-
tenth of the tankers were deployed. In fact, MSC had to
charter nineteen RO/ROs, most of foreign registry, in the
first month of DESERT SHIELD (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
DS/DS plainly showed that RO/RO assets in the RRF and
commercial sector combined are insufficient to meet the
demands of an action of its size (Donovan, 1992). This is
not to say that there were not deficiencies in other areas.
The Marine Corps had urgent requirements for container
assets during DS/DS. Many Marine Corps-procured containers
had to be shipped on foreign vessels after MSC verified
nonavailability of US- flagged vessels (Pena, 1993).
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Finally, it must be noted that some problems with
sealift during DS/DS were extrinsic to the Merchant Marine
or MARAD. Management problems especially were not confined
to MARAD. MSC's management of sealift assets was often
chaotic and undisciplined. MSC reports identified several
instances where ships were not properly matched with cargo.
One factor in bringing this about was the performance of
MSC's Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JaPES).
JaPES was substandard for several reasons. It was immature
and thus it was not well integrated with the systems of the
individual armed services. It could not accommodate the
rapid changes in force requirements during DS/DS. Finally,
it lacked proficient operators. These problems were often
compounded when requirement data supplied by the services
were inaccurate. The end result was a need to schedule
additional ships for sealift. It also necessitated calling
in cargo out of priority order (GAO, 1992).
The Declining Merchant Marine
The rapidly dwindling US-flagged fleet presents a huge
problem in the execution of successful sealift operations.
In the 1980s, the government responded to the problem by
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expanding its ownership of merchant ships. The decision to
rely on ships under direct control continues today. MSC's
role as operator of additional dedicated sealift vessels
points toward a goal of a self-contained logistics system
within DoD (Pouch, 1994). Although MSC still spends one
billion dollars per year on the US maritime industry, making
it the largest customer for US liners and most shipyards, it
is shying away from the traditional use of the merchant
fleet as the primary element of military emergency shipping
(Vail, 1993). In fact, congressional maritime leaders
believe a "quiet revolution" is going on behind closed doors
in DoD that points to a building agenda that has little, if
any, room for commercial sealift. The procurement portion
of the agenda alone could cost US taxpayers $6 billion
(Beargie, 1993b). This effort may hurt the national defense
posture in that economically productive assets (US-flagged
merchant ships) that can be used for sealift are being
replaced by dedicated defense assets subject to budget
restrictions.
Sealift is a current priority. In FY90, before the
onset of Ds/DS, DoD allocated only $375 million to
construction of sealift ships. Yet in FY91 and FY92
Congress appropriated $1.875 billion for sealift
construction. As a result, large contracts have been
initiated. In September of 1993, the Navy awarded National
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Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) a $1.3 billion
contract for six strategic sealift ships to be supplied
through 2001 (Wall Street Journal, 1993) . This was on top
of $1.1 billion in contracts awarded to NASSCO and Newport
News Shipbuilding in July to convert five containerships to
RO/RO vessels (Beargie, 1993b).
Contrasting the situation that the initiation of these
contracts conveys is the reality that the US merchant fleet
is facing a bleak future. America's US-flagged merchant
fleet may be virtually extinct by the year 2000 (Card,
1992a). The US-flagged seagoing fleet contains 359 vessels
today. This fleet ships less than four percent of the
world's oceangoing trade. MARAD estimates the fleet will be
reduced by two-thirds by the end of the decade. DoD's
estimate is even worse---an 81 % reduction of oceangoing
merchant vessels (Pouch, 1994). A reduction this deep would
signal an end to the US Merchant Marine's ability to provide
meaningful sealift. Regardless of where the fleet ends up
with respect to the preceding estimates, it will probably be
reduced to a small fleet kept alive by the last vestiges of
protectionism. Cargo preferences mandated by the Cargo
Preference Act of 1904 (all items procured for or owned by
DoD must be carried in US-flagged vessels), and the Cargo
Preference Act of 1954 (half of the gross tonnage of
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government-generated cargo must be carried on US-flagged
ships) will sustain the oceangoing fleet at a fiducial level
of little or no use for national security.
This trend has started. Two large US-flagged shipping
companies, SeaLand and American President Lines, have said
they intend to begin to reflag in 1995, if comprehensive
tax, manning, and operational policies are not changed
(Card, 1992a). Both companies have reflagging applications
on file at MARAD but there is no legal deadline for MARAD to
act (Beargie, 1993c) and executive order prohibits
reflagging for the time being (Marti, 1993). Nonetheless,
statements from the two lines suggest reflagging will take
place unless Congress enacts a new maritime reform program
that includes financial support for the carriers (Beargie,
1993a) .
The removal of financial support has placed the US
merchant fleet on the precipice of extinction. Abrupt
elimination of Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) and
Operating Differential Subsidies (ODS), in 1982 and 1981
respectively, after nearly one-half century of their
existence, is indeed proving to be the death-knell for the
Merchant Marine (Marti, 1993). The effect of elimination of
CDSs was immediate. A total of four commercial ship orders
has been placed in private US shipyards in the last nine
years (Misch, 1994d) and US shipyards share of worldwide
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commercial shipbuilding has concurrently shrunk from ten
percent to zero. ODSs, since they were guaranteed in
contracts of up to twenty years in length, are slowly being
phased out of existence. As a result, subsidies have
decreased yearly and will decrease to zero when the last
contract expires in 2001. Annual outlays have dropped to
just above $200 million from near $400 million in the early
1980s. Recent legislation seeks to restore subsidies, but
it may be too little and too late.
The impending ouster of the Bush Administration in 1992
opened the door for subsidy legislation. A maritime reform
policy was proposed in the Maritime Reform Act (HR 5627) of
1992. This Act sought to amend the Merchant Marine Act of
1936, as amended, to establish a Contingency Retainer
Program providing federal assistance for up to 74 vessels
for seven years, beginning at $2.5 million per ship per year
in the first two years and phasing down to $1.6 million per
ship in the seventh year, and to improve the US-flagged
merchant marine. The bill was not passed by the end of the
102nd Congress and was not subsequently reintroduced
(Congressional Index, 1992, 1993).
However, the 103rd Congress introduced similar
legislation in House Bills 2151 and 2152. These were backed
by Rep. Gerry Studds, D.-Mass., Chairman of the House
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee. The bills seek to
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amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended, through
the establishment of a maritime security fleet and seek to
encourage merchant marine investment, respectively
(Congressional Index, 1993).
House Bill 2151, the Maritime Security and
Competitiveness Act of 1993, would subsidize US foreign
commerce vessels at a level of $2.3 million in FY94, and
$2.1 million for nine years thereafter. Vessels covered,
estimated at fifty-two to seventy over the next ten years,
include general cargo vessels (RO/RO, barge carrying
vessels, or container vessels), vessels that hold ODS
contracts currently, and other vessels deemed acceptable to
the government in national emergencies. The bill also makes
a small move toward reintroduction of long-lost CDS payments
through "transition payments" to US shipyards for
construction of some commercial vessels (Beargie, 1993c).
Still, the bill does not do much to stop the dangerous
decline in US Merchant Marine assets. Subsidies in the $1.2
billion bill would average about $120 million per year, less
than two-thirds of the current residual ODS payments.
Unless the program is broadened to cover approximately 100
ships, carriers will probably continue to switch ships to
foreign flags (Beargie, 1993c).
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Although the shipping lines are optimistic that the
Senate will indeed broaden the program (the bill passed the
House overwhelmingly, 347-65, on November 4, 1993 after an
Administration Policy Statement supported it), there is
little reason to believe this will be the case. Two factors
are primary. First, the Administration's support statement
promised work to fund the bill at "approximately one billion
dollars over ten years." Two billion dollars over this
period would be the minimum to keep payments where they are
now. As all discretionary spending must identify funding
sources, it is unlikely that additional monies will be
found. There is also the danger that money to fund the
program will corne from sources directly tied to the industry
(Reed, 1994). Second, Administration support for a broad
and sustained subsidy program is questionable.
Vice President Gore's National Policy Review (NPR)
commission leaked a draft paper in July of 1993 that
recommended, among other things, an end to the maritime
subsidy program. The FMC and maritime industry lobbyists,
along with many members of Congress and Transportation
Secretary Pena, convinced the Gore panel to pull back from
this recommendation (Vail, 1993). The effort succeeded in
that the final report released in September 1993 dropped
this recommendation (Bonney, 1993). But Administration
support for sustained, generous subsidies is doubtful.
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Along these lines, the premier institution in the
training of merchant mariners, The Merchant Marine Academy,
was among the federal institutions slated for closure in
1998 in Vice President Gore's NPR. Congress has not yet
mandated this recommendation, but the school's $37 million
annual price tag makes it an easy target, especially since
it sends graduates to a dying industry. Since the
elimination of subsidies about one decade ago, only about a
third of each graduating class has been able to find a
billet on a ship (Fielder, 1993).
MARAn and the NDRF
MARAD learned many lessons from DS/DS and took some
corrective actions as a result. These actions address
manning, port locations, and maintenance. All of the
measures cover operational issues. If executed, they will
make the existing force far more capable (bringing it near
its touted capability). This capability is examined in the
next chapter under the normative case, which assumes the
operational improvements are successful. Nonetheless,
administrative improvements matter little if the hard assets
are missing. On this issue, it is obvious that fleet
30
composition, especially with respect to ship types and ages,
is suboptimal.
Before any other issue is examined, it must be stated
that the ability to carry out any measures on a continuing
basis hinges on funding, which has been volatile. In FY90,
before DS/DS, MARAD requested $239 million for the RRF .
Con g r e s s approved barely one-third of that. This funding
was so low that the Secretary of Transportation, Samuel
Skinner, stated "the readiness status of many Ready Reserve
Fleet Ships is not realistic" (Phillips, 1990). Funding
shot up to $165 million for FY91, nearly double the previous
year's allowance, in the midst of the difficulties revealed
in getting RRF ships underway. However, funding for the
program was reduced again, to $116 million, for FY92.
In response to the abysmal performance of the five-day
RRF in DS/DS, MARAD contracted retention crews, consisting
of two licensed marine engineers, for several ships assigned
five-day readiness. Today, 21 ships employ two-person crews
that conduct preventative maintenance and provide the base
of a deployable operating crew (Pena, 1993).
Next, MARAD created an entirely new readiness category
for its highest priority vessels. This category was
designated ROS-4, for four-day Reduced Operating Status.
ROS-4 vessels are now crewed by ten persons, licensed and
31
unlicensed, who live aboard year-round. Seventeen ships now
have ROS maintenance crews (Pena, 1993).
Many guidelines for administering the RRF were
overhauled. An Outporting Program was implemented in order
to provide contracted lay-berths for RRF ships near expected
loading ports. Fifty RRF vessels were assigned to outport
locations by October of 1992. Vessels in the RRF are now
subject to a "no known material deficiency" policy that
mandates that known deficiencies are to be corrected while
the vessel is in inactive status. Lastly, existing DoD
requirements for logistics and material readiness were
clarified to MARAD. The US Coast Guard was engaged to
monitor these requirements as part of the ship inspection
criteria for the RRF (Pena, 1993).
Despite these actions, DoD made an effort to place the
RRF under its control in June of 1993. A legislative
proposal cited inefficient employment of the RRF in DS/DS
and the similarities among its fast-sealift ships and the
MSC FSSs as reasons to execute the transfer. The Deputy
Secretary of Defense held the proposal in abeyance until the
US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) could complete a
detailed feasibility study (Jeremiah, 1993).
USTRANSCOM recommended that the management of the RRF
program remain with MARAD. It found no evidence of cost
savings in transferring the RRF to DoD. This left the
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decision to be made based on operational and policy issues.
On this basis, given the level of funding provided,
USTRANSCOM found that the RRF, three years after DS/DS, is
being managed in an efficient and effective manner.
Concurrently, the study mandated that management of the FSS
program should remain within DoD to ensure rapid and
reliable sealift in any contingency (USTRANSCOM, 1993) It
is noteworthy that the study did not address whether the RRF
is capable of completing its legislatively-set mission or
what contingencies the RRF is unprepared for. Regardless,
the consolidation under DoD did not take place. Stateside
sealift capability (this, by definition, excludes
prepositioned shipping) is thus administered as shown in
Table 1.
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TABLE 1: STATESIDE GOVERNMENT-ADMINISTERED SEALIFT
Readiness FSS ROS-4 RRF-5 RRF-10 RRF-20
Availability
(days) 4 4 5 10 20
Shipyard work
required? No No Yes Yes Yes
Crew size 21 10 2 0 0
Ported load loading shipyard shipyard near NDRF
port port fleets
sea trials/yr 2 1 ~ ~ ~
dock trials/yr 4 0 ~ ~ ~
Source: USTRANSCOM, 1993
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DS/DS revealed severe deficiencies in the composition
of the RRF. The composition of the RRF favors older
breakbulks and tankers. Tankers will indeed be crucial in
conflicts where oil is not readily available (oil and
refined products were abundantly available in Saudi Arabia)
But RRF tankers are small, far smaller than the typical
carriers of refined products used in cabotage. Breakbulks
are practical in a few situations due to their small
carrying capacities. They can be employed in small-scale
operations in Third World countries where unsophisticated
loading techniques are employed (Gibson and Shuford, 1991)
Otherwise, the ships are outmoded and of little use. The
average breakbulk holds but one-third of the cargo held in a
typical RO/RO. The breakbulks and tankers were acquired, it
seems, to take commercially unviable ships off the hands of
the maritime industry. They were acquired to the exclusion
of the more useful military cargo carriers---RO/ROs.
The shortage in RO/ROs, in both the RRF and the
Merchant Marine, which kept much cargo on the docks in
DS/DS, was extensively questioned after the war. Seventy
percent of the commercial fleet is containerized, not RO/RO,
which is what the military needs most early in troop
deployments (Donovan, 1991). The shortage will not be
addressed in the commercial fleet, owing to the fact that
35
RO/ROs are of limited commercial usefulness. It appears
that the shortfall in DS/DS, examined in the next chapter,
drove current acquisition plans for twenty large RO/ROs of
300,000 square feet each (yielding a total capacity of six
million square feet). Nine are programmed to be used in APS
for Army equipment while the other eleven are slated as
fast-sealift ships to carry surge cargo for Army heavy
divisions and their combat support.
The acquisitions are of questionable merit, however.
The RO/ROs are to be diesels capable of twenty-three knots.
This speed adds at least one week to a 10,000-mile transit
when compared to the ability of the current fleet (eight
150,000 square foot RO/ROs that are capable of thirty-three
knots). Their size, 950 feet by 105 feet at the beam, does
allow for Panama Canal transit, but it is too large for many
world ports. Finally, the large capacity may preclude
efficient discharge at smaller ports, standing men and
material into more danger than necessary. Despite the
objections of the MSC Commander, who advocated a package of
forty smaller RO/RO vessels (Donovan, 1992), purchase of the
large, slow RO/ROs has begun. Congress appropriated $440
million in FY93 to order the first ten of these ships (Card,
1992) .
Another question with respect to funding priority
involves containerization. There is no doubt that the
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military must make more of its cargo amenable to
containerization. This is slowly happening. There are
logistical problems, however. Today's containerships, as
opposed to first-generation containerships, require gantry
cranes ashore to unload their containers. These are not
always available in third world ports. To overcome this
problem, MARAD started a "T-ACS" program in 1982 that
converted existing commercial containerships to crane ships
to be used to unload other containerships in ports where
cranes are unavailable. Additionally, T-ACS ships hold a
small amount of cargo, roughly the same amount as a typical
breakbulk ship in the fleet. Their acquisition is nearly
finished. Nine of the ten crane ships are on line (Pena,
1993). Beside the T-ACS program, the government purchased
thousands of flat racks (floor pieces with steel frames
designed to fit in individual container spaces) to give
container ships the ability to carry oversized cargo. The
containerization efforts cost over $100 million dollars.
Yet little of this capability was used during DS/DS, raising
serious doubt about its usefulness in sealift operations
(Gibson and Shuford, 1991). For instance, only one port,
Military Ocean Terminal, Bayonne, was able to use flat racks
to load Army UH-1 helicopters (Hopkins, 1991). still, MSC
maintains that T-ACS ships and containerization have a
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greater role to play than was shown in the Gulf War
(Donovan, 1992).
Lastly, the IRF remains a troubling entity. IRF ships,
that round out the NDRF, make ships in the RRF look like
cutting-edge technology. The IRF theoretically represents a
source of additional shipping in the highest degrees of
mobilization and attrition. In reality, most of the ships
are WWII vintage and are hopelessly obsolete (Gibson and
Shuford, 1991). No ships in the fleet were mobilized for
DS/DS. Ongoing maintenance, which consists of little more
than cathodic protection, dehumidification, draft
measurements, and cursory hull inspections, does not support
any realistic opportunity for activation. Many of the
ships, berthed in Suisun Bay, CA, Beaumont, TX, and
Fort Eustis, VA have degrade to unseaworthiness. Scrap
metal is a depressed commodity currently, so the ships
continue to drain operating funds as the government slowly
sells them into scrap.
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CHAPTER THREE
DATA ANALYSIS
Introduction
Chapter Two presents persuasive evidence of
deficiencies in the US Merchant Marine and MARAD related to
sealift. Nonetheless, the crux of this study is its
numerical analysis. Hence a review of the methodology is
now in order.
As stated earlier, three cases are examined in this
study. They include the operational case---what actually
happened, the normative case---what would have happened if
the assets available were optimally employed, and the future
case---what could be expected to happen in a similar
situation in 1999 based on current policy and acquisition
plans.
Each of these cases is examined at three times. Two of
these times, three weeks and two months, are discrete
points . The other time is a period--Dne-half year. This
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distinction is necessary. The first two times pertain to
surge shipping, or the initial placement of cargo in a
theater of conflict. Recent war games show that the first
three weeks of a crisis are critical. By this time, a
deployed heavy division must have its combat support and
combat systems support (CS/CSS), such as line haul,
maintenance, service, and supply units, that need far more
cargo space than the division itself, in place (Pasquarette
and Foster, 1993). Two months is similarly significant. A
five-division contingency corps must be ready to fight, that
is, it must have its CS/CSS in place, in any theater by that
time (Gibson and Shuford, 1991). The last period relates to
sustainment shipping, or resupply and reinforcement of
troops that are already deployed. This period has no nexus
to a specific operational plan of action. Rather, it owes
to the fact that the only good test of sustainment sealift
in the last quarter-century has been DS/DS. The sustainment
effort in DS/DS lasted approximately one-half year, so this
period is used.
The basis of this study is a simple comparison of cargo
carrying capability to cargo requirements. The units used
are standard units of measurement in the literature, square
footage for surge sealift, and short tons for sustainment
sealift. Shipping and manning records (both of which are
piecemeal) for the operation, supplied mainly but not
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exclusively by MARAD (an organization under the cognizance
of the US Department of Transportation), are compared
against operational requirements defined in a variety of
non-classified military sources (such as Fundamentals of
Force Planning, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Army and Sea
Power) to yield deficiencies in non-DoD sealift. These
include outright shortages of merchant mariners, inadequate
equipment performance, mainly in engineering plants, and
finally, shortages (from most significant to least
significant) in cargo space available on RO/RO ships,
container ships, and breakbulk carriers. The constituents
of the overall deficiency are manifestly diverse.
Nonetheless, they can all be expressed in the final
variables---shortage of shipboard square footage or short
tons.
Timing is the essence of this study as most of the
deficiencies it documents are temporal. Still, the
deficiencies are significant. The normative case requires
on-time delivery as a tenet of national security policy .
Simply, cargo that arrives late is of little help to a force
that has been decimated or displaced. Documenting these
temporal shortages, by analyzing the problem at two distinct
times and one period, is then the prime goal of this
chapter.
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The analysis is presented in four sections that follow.
The first section, data collection, presents the numbers and
assumptions that are used in the three subsequent sections.
The subsequent sections examine each case on the timeline
outlined earlier.
Data Collection
Over 3.3 million short tons of dry cargo were delivered
in DS/DS. Foreign-flagged charters comprised the greatest
portion of this, about 713,000 short tons. The RRF shipped
690,000 short tons. A Special Middle East Space Agreement
(SMESA) was arranged with seven US-flagged liner companies
as a modification to their normal commercial service. Under
SMESA, the carriers moved up to 2700 forty-foot equivalent
units (FEUs) per week. These containerized shipments, about
669,000 short tons, comprised over one-fifth of the total
effort. US commercial charters, mostly short-term, shipped
480,000 tons. MSC fast sealift vessels---seven of eight
were operational in the conflict---shipped 322,000 short
tons. Finally, prepositioned assets, MPS and APS, shipped
164,000 and 116,000 short tons respectively. Figures 2, 3,
and 4 graphically display the sealift effort in DS/DS.
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Figure 2 shows the constituent contributions in total, while
Figures 3 and 4 break down the contributions of government
assets and the US Merchant Marine.
The five tables that immediately follow are presented
in order to evaluate surge assets for DS/DS and the
performance of those assets. Table 2 describes the 96-ship
RRF that existed during DS/DS. Most of these ships were in
a five-day readiness status. Forty-four of the seventy-nine
ships activated in the RRF in DS/DS were activated in the
surge portion of the conflict. Of these forty-four, only
thirty-seven were tendered in time to participate in the
surge supply effort as defined in this study, that is, they
were able to offload their cargo within two months of the
beginning of the operation on August 10, 1990. Tables 3
through 6 complete the description of the surge
mobilization, activation and tendering of the RRF.
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FIGURE 2: STRATEGIC SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS
Percent of total sealift
Legend
E] RRF
~ MSC FSSs
II MPS
• APS
[ill SMESA
II US Charters
II Foreign Charters
Source: Card, 1992b
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FIGURE 3: GOVERNMENT SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS
Percent of government sealift
Legend
mJ RRF
m MSC FSSs
II MPS
• APS
Source: Card, 1992b
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FIGURE 4: US MERCHANT MARINE SEALIFT OF DRY CARGO IN DS/DS
Percent of US Merchant Marine sealift
Legend
[ill SMESA
1m US Charters
Source: Card, 1992b
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TABLE 2: RRF SHIPS BY TYPE AND READINESS STATUS
Ship type RRF-5 RRF-1O RRF-20
Breakbulk 30 21 0
RO/RO 16 0 1
T-ACS 8 0 0
LASH/SEABEE 7 0 0
Tanker 3 6 2
Troopship 1 1 0
Source: RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 3: SURGE SHIP ACTIVATION BY SHIP TYPE
Ship type(# activated)
RO/RO (17)
Breakbulk (17)
LASH/SEABEE (7)
T-ACS (2)
Tanker (1)
Dates activated
8/10-17
8/12-1;8/18-5;8/20-8; 8/30-1;
9/21-2
8/14-5;8/30-1;9/21-1
8/20-2
8/31-1
Source: Skinner, 1991; Card, 1992a; and RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 4: TENDERING OF SURGE SHIPPING/DELAY TO ACTIVATION
Vessel Type Tender Delay
Date (days)
CAPE INSCRIPTION RO/RO 15 AUG 5
CAPE HUDSON RO/RO 15 AUG 5
CAPE DOMINGO RO/RO 18 AUG 8
CAPE LOBOS RO/RO 18 AUG 8
CAPE HORN RO/RO 19 AUG 9
CAPE FAREWELL LASH 19 AUG 9
CAPE FLATTERY LASH 20 AUG 10
JUPITER RO/RO 20 AUG 10
CAPE MOHICAN SEABEE 21 AUG 7
CAPE ISABEL RO/RO 21 AUG 11
CAPE MAY SEABEE 22 AUG 8
CAPE DOUGLAS RO/RO 23 AUG 13
CAPE HENRY RO/RO 24 AUG 14
CAPE EDMONT RO/RO 24 AUG 14
CAPE DUCATO RO/RO 24 AUG 14
CAPE CLEAR BB 24 AUG 12
METEOR RO/RO 25 AUG 15
COMET RO/RO 25 AUG 15
CAPE BRETON BB 25 AUG 7
GULF BANKER BB 26 AUG 8
ADM CALLAGHAN RO/RO 26 AUG 16
CAPE BORDA BB 26 AUG 8
CAPE JUBY BB 28 AUG 10
CAPE DECISION RO/RO 29 AUG 19
WASHINGTON BB 29 AUG 11
CAPE CATOCHE BB 30 AUG 10
CAPE ALEXANDER BB 31 AUG 11
EQUALITY STATE T-ACS 31 AUG 11
GULF TRADER BB 01 SEP 12
CAPE ARCHWAY BB 03 SEP 14
CAPE MENDOCINO SEABEE 03 SEP 20+
CORNHUSKER STATE T-ACS 07 SEP 18
AMERICAN OSPREY TANKER 11 SEP 12
CAPE JOHNSON BB 11 SEP 20+
MAINE BB 12 SEP 20+
CAPE NOME BB 13 SEP 20+
DEL VALLE BB 14 SEP 20+
Source: Skinner, 1991 and Card, 1992a
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TABLE 5: SHIPS ACTIVATED FOR SURGE BUT TENDERED POST-SURGE
Vessel Type
CAPE GIRARDEAU BB
AUSTRAL LIGHTNING LASH
CAPE GIBSON BB
CAPE LAMBERT RO/RO
CAPE FLORIDA LASH
CAPE ANN BB
CAPE DIAMOND RO/RO
Source: Card, 1992a
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TABLE 6: RRF LATE TENDERING SUMMARY---SURGE SEALIFT
Ship Tendered RRF-5 RRF-1O RRF-20 Total %
on time 8 3 1 12 27
1-5 days l a t e 10 2 0 12 27
6-20 days late 15 1 0 16 36
20+ days late 4 0 0 4 9
Total 37 6 1 44 100
Source: RRFWG, 1991
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Naturally, many lessons were learned in the aftermath
of DS/DS. Chapter Two showed that deficiencies were spread
mainly between Merchant Marine assets and the RRF. The path
chosen to rectify these deficiencies involves strengthening
RRF assets and prepositioned assets through purchases or
long-term charters. Table 7 describes the acquisition path
for RRF assets. Table 8 covers changes expected in
prepositioned assets.
The final, and most important, values in the collection
effort are those data used as base assumptions in the
analyses that follow. These data are necessary owing to the
fact that the sealift effort was so massive. Simply,
examining each of the 466 sealift voyages (Misch, 1994a) in
DS/DS as a discrete measurement of speed and cargo carriage
values for each voyage is beyond the scope of this analysis,
if possible at all. The values that follow in Table 9 are
taken from values reported in or extracted from the
literature (which, naturally, vary slightly) .
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TABLE 7: RRF ASSETS--DS/OS THROUGH 1999
Ship type OS/OS 1993 1999
Breakbulk 51 48 49
T-ACS 8 9 10
LASH/SEABEE 7 7 7
RO/RO 17 18 36
Troopship 3 6 2
Tanker 13 13 36
Total 96 98 140
Source: USTRANSCOM, 1993 and RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 8: DOD-ADMINISTERED SEALIFT ASSETS~PS/APS AND FSS
Time FSS APS MPS
DS/DS
1993
1999
7 (1 aaC)
8
17 (incl. 9 LMSRs)
12 13
12 13
23 (incl. 11 LMSRs) 13
Source: USTRANSCaM, 1993 and RRFWG, 1991
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TABLE 9: CARGO AND SPEED ASSUMPTIONS (NOTIONAL VALUES)
Variable
Cargo Carriage
RO/RO ship (Donovan, 1992)
LMSR ship (Donovan, 1992)
all others(barge carriers, T-ACS, BB)
1 Division (Gibson and Shuford, 1991)
Stowage factor (Marti, 1993)
Speed (maximum)
Fast Sealift ships (Donovan, 1992)
LMSRs (Donovan, 1992)
all others (RRFWG, 1991)
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Notional Value
150, 0 0 0 f t 2 DE
3 5 0, 000 f t 2 DE
50, 000 fe DE
2, 8 00 , 0 0 0 f t 2 DE
0.75
33 knots
24 knots
22 knots
Test No.1: Surge Shipping at Three Weeks
As stated earlier, the first cornerstone of an emplaced
force is a heavy division. Defense planners expect this
division to be in place, anywhere, within three weeks of
call-up (Gibson and Shuford, 1991). A heavy division
complements the initial landing of light troops and Marines .
In DS/DS, this force consisted of the 1st and 7th Marine
Expeditionary Brigades and the Army's 82nd Airborne
Division. The light troops have their footprints, that is,
troops and basic weaponry, amphibiously landed or airlifted.
CS/CSS is supplied by MPS/APS. The heavy division, whose
troops are also airlifted in, unlike the light troops and
Marines that preceded it, receives its unit equipment, 2.8
million ft 2 of CS/CSS, also referred to as unit equipment
(DE) from stateside assets. In DS/DS, this division was the
24th Mechanized Infantry Division.
The first tier of sealift, fast sealift, is split
between MSC's fast sealift ships, converted SL-7s, and
MARAD's fast sealift RO/ROs. In DS/DS, MARAD's RO/ROs were
RRF-5 ships. Today, they are undergoing conversion into the
ROS-4 program. In DS/DS, all eight MSC FSSs and all 17 RRF
RO/ROs were activated on 10 August. Seven MSC ships were
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tendered at an average of 6 days. Fifteen RRF RO/ROs were
tendered at a median of 12 days.
The operative case is examined first. Twenty-two ships
were tendered for fast sealift. The capacity of these ships
would be:
(22 s hips ) (l50, 0 0 0 f t 2 / S hip) (. 7 5 ) = 2, 4 75, 0 0 0 f t 2 DE
This is less than the requirement, 2.8 million square feet.
Hence, sealift assets were insufficient regardless of the
time required to bring the ships to the loading ports, load
them, complete the transit, and unload them. Nonetheless,
the tendering delay documented above, along with the fact
that the FSSs averaged only 23 knots (Gibson and Shuford,
1991), would have made the fast-sealift component
unsuccessful in any case in DS/DS.
The normative case is examined next. In this case, all
eight MSC FSSs and all seventeen MARAD FSSs would be
tendered on time, in five days and four days respectively.
The capacity of these ships would be:
(25 ships) (150, 000ft2/ship) (. 75) = 2,812,500 ft 2 DE
This exceeds the requirement. Now, one must look at the
time to transit. Availabilities are 4 days for the MSC
ships and 5 days for the RRF ships. Loading and unloading
times are approximately two days each for a total of four
days. Ten thousand miles is transitted in twelve days at
thirty-three knots. Adding these numbers, the MSC ships
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arrive in twenty days, the RRF ships in twenty-one days.
The postulated arrivals, within the three week surge
requirement, point to a successful performance.
Finally, the future case is examined. Plans call for
augmenting the RRF force with nineteen additional RO/ROs, to
a total of thirty-six, and placing nearly all RO/ROs in ROS-
4 status. The MSC fleet of eight fast-sealift ships is to
gain nine LMSRs. The LMSRs, with diesel plants capable of
only 24 knots, would require nearly eighteen days to
traverse 10,000 miles. Adding this period to the activation
and loading periods would result in a period of well over
three weeks, so LMSRs can be eliminated from this portion of
the analysis. Utilizing the calculation from the previous
two cases:
(4 4 s hip s ) (150, 000 f t 2 / s hip) (. 75 ) = 4, 950, 00 0 f t 2 UE
This exceeds the requirement by 75%. Transit periods would
be the same as in the previous case, with the exception that
the new four-day availability for RRF ships would bring the
total time for all fast-sealift ships to twenty days---an
acceptable performance.
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Test No.2: Surge Shipping at Two Months
Defense planners had envisioned that five divisions
could be emplaced, with their equipment, anywhere within two
months (Gibson and Shuford, 1991). These five divisions,
formed from the remainder of prepositioned assets, forward
deployed assets close to the area (in DS/DS, for example,
divisions were mobilized from Europe), airlift, and
amphibious landings, would require fourteen million (five
times 2.8 million) square feet of CS/CSS to be fully
functional.
The operative case, where chartered shipping was just
beginning to materialize and private US-flagged shipping was
not requisitioned---the effort was still almost exclusively
run with government assets---has already been exhaustively
examined by Shuford (1990). Overall results of this paper
were reported in Fundamentals of Force Planning (1991).
Assuming that commanders desired the CS/CSS to move with the
divisions, the calculated shortfall in sealift was 5.8
million square feet of UE (Gibson and Shuford, 1991). Given
the requirement of approximately 14 million square feet of
UE, one can infer that approximately eight million feet of
UE was delivered at the two-month point.
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The preceding numbers are well established. This
study, then, will examine only the normative and future
cases.
In the normative case, the entire RRF would have been
mobilized in time for each ship to complete at least one
trip in the surge portion of the conflict. The RRF is
legislatively mandated to have this capability. The fast
sealift ships, with twenty and twenty-one day arrivals for
the first trip, would have sixteen-day transits (including
loading) thereafter. They would be able to complete two
trips if, one, they were mobilized at the very outset of the
conflict, and two, no significant queuing delays occurred
nor any lengthy non-steaming maintenance was required while
completing three 10,000-mile trips (one to the theater, one
back to the states, and one back to the theater). As the
normative case assumes best-case conditions, two deliveries
are assumed in the analysis.
Table 10 shows that had sealift gone as planned, there
still would have been a significant shortfall in a long-
range conflict like DS/DS. The nearly eleven million ft 2 of
cargo, while forty percent larger than the eight million ft 2
that were actually shipped within two months, was still well
short of the requirement.
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TABLE 10: SURGE SHIPPING AT TWO MONTHS, NORMATIVE CASE
Ship Type No. Cargo (ft2) stow Factor Trips Total (ft2)
MPS!APS 25 150,000 0.75 1 2,812,500
FSS 8 150,000 0.75 2 1,800,000
RRF RO!RO 17 150,000 0.75 2 3,825,000
RRF BB 51 50,000 0.75 1 1,912,500
RRF T-ACS 8 50,000 0.75 1 300,000
RRF BARGE 7 50,000 0.75 1 262,500
Total 10,912,000
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This established, it is now appropriate to examine this
case for 1999 based on current acquisition plans, which were
detailed in the previous section. Again, only the steam-
driven fast-sealift ships would be capable of making two
trips in the period. The LMSRs, while slightly faster than
the average for the fleet, would still be able to complete
only one transit.
Table 11 displays the result of this analysis . A total
of twenty million square feet of DE capability in this
period is acceptable, The capability exceeds the
requirement, fourteen million square feet, by over forty
percent.
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TABLE 11: SURGE SHIPPING AT TWO MONTHS, FUTURE CASE
Ship Type No. Cargo (ft2) stow Factor Trips Total (ft2)
MPS/APS 25 150,000 0.75 1 2,812,500
+LMSRs 11 350,000 0.75 1 3,850,000
FSS 8 150,000 0.75 2 1,800,000
RRF RO/RO 27 150,000 0.75 2 6,075,000
+LMSRs 9 350,000 0.75 1 3,150,000
RRF BB 49 50,000 0.75 1 1,837,500
RRF T-ACS 10 50,000 0.75 1 375,000
RRF BARGE 7 50,000 0.75 1 262,500
Total 20,162,500
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Test No.3: Sustainment Shipping
DS/DS required a massive amount of sustainment sealift.
As opposed to the surge phase of the operation, in which
shipments consisted mainly of large-sized and wheeled and
tracked cargo (tanks, personnel carriers, mortar
assemblies), the sustainment shipments consisted more of
stores and ammunition. This cargo is necessarily measured
in short tons, not square feet. The sustainment cargo is
slightly more suitable for the merchant fleet, as more of it
can be containerized. This is not to say that DE shipment
stopped after the surge phase of the operation. It is
simply measured in short tons for this portion of the
analysis (a FSS carries 15,000 tons of cargo fully loaded).
Nonetheless, it was a far smaller portion of the total
cargo.
The operational case is now examined. An emplaced
armored division requires 800 tons of cargo per day
(Van Peursem, 1994). The five heavy divisions alone
required 120,000 tons of cargo per month (4,000 tons per day
times 30 days). This does not include the Marines, hospital
units, or army light troops that were also deployed.
Additionally, stockpiles need to be amassed for offensive
operations. Sustainment requirements triple, at least, when
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troops are engaged (Van Peursem, 1994). Given that
offensive operations were imminent when the build-up was
complete at the end of 1990, a reasonable estimate for
required cargo delivery after this point would be 360,000
tons per month (120,000 times three).
Examining sealift deliveries at this point in Table 12,
one notes that deliveries far exceeded the baseline
engagement criteria for the emplaced divisions. In fact,
nearly one million short tons of cargo, over one-fourth of
the total cargo shipped for the operation, was delivered in
January alone. From this comparison, and ultimately, the
success of the mission, one can state that sustainment
sealift was sufficient in DS/DS.
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TABLE 12: SURGE AND SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT IN DS/DS
Month
Surge
Aug./Sep. 90
Sustainment
October 90
November 90
December 90
January 91
February 91
March 91
Total
Source: GAO, 1992
Dry Cargo(short tons)
505,000
434,000
264,000
448,000
910,000
527,000
301,000
3,390,000
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As sealift in the operational case proved sufficient,
there is no need to detail the normative case. Any
improvements in a best-case analysis would, manifestly,
further increase the margin of sufficiency.
This leaves the future case to be examined. Four
primary assumptions are made. First, all government-
administered acquisitions will be complete by 1999. Second,
America's foreign trade merchant fleet will be virtually
extinct by 1999 (Card, 1992c). All ODS and CDS will have
expired by that point. Barring significant reform of
maritime laws, the merchant fleet will have shrunk to a
brown-water cabotage fleet. Third, activation of the
Sealift Readiness Program or outright requisitioning of US
Merchant Marine assets will not occur, just as it did not
occur during DS/DS, for it would cripple many industries,
including strategic industries, that rely on cabotage.
Finally, foreign shipping will not be available. This is a
reasonable assumption as the next long-range operation may
not be any where near as popular on the international front
as DS/DS. Assuming this comes to pass, sealift becomes an
operation that relies on government assets exclusively.
This begs the question whether government assets, which
comprised 41.1 % of sealift in DS/DS, will be adequate to
sustain an operation of DS/DS's size and geographical
separation in the future.
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For government controlled assets to deliver the whole
sustainment cargo, the carrying capacity shown in DS/DS will
have to increase roughly 130 %. Does the 1999 fleet possess
this capability? The following analysis suggests it does
not.
The analysis shown in Table 13 takes the percentage of
sealift in DS/DS by the various subgroups, and projects
future capability based on changes in capability of the
fleet. This is done with the use of a weighted-average
cargo-carrying multiplier for each subgroup. The multiplier
is relatively straightforward for subgroups where the change
involves ships of the same cargo size and speed. For
instance, the MSC FSSs go from seven converted SL-7s to
eight converted SL-7s. The multiplier in this case is
simple, eight divided by seven, or 1.14. Where different
ship types are introduced, their cargo handling capabilities
and speed must be taken into account. For example, the APS
fleet adds 11 LMSRs to its 12 RO/ROs. The LMSRs have 2.33
times the cargo-carrying capacity (350,000 ft 2 versus
150,000 ft 21, but only 0.71 times the speed capability (24
knots versus 33 knots) of the RO/ROs. The product of these
numbers is weighted on a per-ship basis with the number of
new ships introduced, added to the existing inventory, and
this result is divided by the original inventory to yield
the multiplication factor, or multiplier, in Table 13.
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TABLE 13: SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT, FUTURE CASE
Subgroup OS/OS% OS/OS 1999 Mult. 1999%
MPS 5.2 13 Ro/ROs 13 Ro/ROs 1. 00 5.2
APS 3.7 12 Ro/ROs 12 Ro/ROs 2.52 9.3
11 LMSRs
MSC FSS 10.2 7 FSS 8 FSS 1.14 11.4
RRF 22.0 17 Ro/RO 27 Ro/RO 1. 82 40.1
7 BARGE 10 BARGE
43 BIB 43 BIB
6 T-ACS 10 T-ACS
9 LMSRs
Total 66.0
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Table 13 shows that sustainment sealift can not be provided
by the surge fleet. Reliance on government assets
exclusively will provide roughly two-thirds of the required
sealift in an operation the scope and size of DS/DS, despite
the vast improvement in government-administered assets.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis yields mixed results. In some
cases, sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not. Table
14 displays the result for each of the cases analyzed.
The operational case in DS/DS shows that while
sustainment shipping was satisfactory, surge sealift assets
were insufficient. Surge shipping was unsuccessful in the
initial stage due to inefficient use of ships. This was
exacerbated by an outright shortage of ships necessary to
complete the surge shipping effort in the required two
months. Sustainment shipping was satisfactory. This
success owed to the availability of foreign shipping, the
existing ability of reserve forces to move cargo, and the
residual capability of the US Merchant Marine.
The analysis of the normative case contains one change
from the operational case. Initial surge delivery of one
heavy division would have been satisfactory if fast-sealift
assets performed up to their capability. It is reasonable
to surmise that operational and administrative improvements
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TABLE 14: RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS- IS SEALIFT SUFFICIENT?
Sealift Time Requirement Operational Normative 1999
Stage
Initial 3 1 Heavy Div No Yes Yes
Surge wks 2.8x10 6 ft 2
Total 2 5 Heavy Div No1 No Yes
Surge mos 14x10 6 ft 2
Sustainment ~ yr 3.2x10 6 fe Yes Yes No
lTh i s case was not analyzed in this study as it was
thoroughly analyzed by Shuford (1990) and portions of the results
were subsequently published (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
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implemented by MARAD and MSC would in fact bring fast-
sealift capability up to speed. Regardless, the total surge
effort would fall short of the mark . Assets are
insufficient, no matter how they are employed.
Examining the surge portions of the future case yields
some interesting insights. Initial surge capability remains
acceptable from the normative case, although the acquisition
of LMSRs adds nothing due to inherent speed restrictions.
Total surge cargo is reversed from a six million ft 2
shortfall to a similarly sized surplus. This improvement in
fast-sealift assets, by MARAD and MSC, increases the margin
of acceptability by 75 %. In fact, it is a step toward the
ability to provide fast-sealift provisions in two regional
conflicts. This capability has been a long-held tenet of
national military policy, unfeasible for at least the last
two decades, that received much attention recently as the
Secretary of Defense proposed scaling it back to a "fight-
hold-fight" policy. From these data, it appears that as far
as surge shipping is required, it is indeed possible for the
government to purchase sufficient assets for its execution.
Sustainment shipping is another matter, however. An
extensive upgrade in the capability of shipping that is
government-owned or leased is not sufficient to stem the
tide of a declining Merchant Marine. This is especially
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true if foreign shipping is not available---a distinct
possibility. In fact, government shipping falls a full
third short the requirements seen in DS/DS. Simply, it is
not practical to buy a fleet for sustainment sealift. The
shipping requirements are too great. Sustainment shipping
must be supplied, at least partially, by its historical
source---the US Merchant Marine .
The results of the analysis, together with the
disturbing points in the literature review, reveal a problem
that is broad in size and scope. The four negative cases in
the analysis support the hypothesis. Even one negative case
is unacceptable from the standpoint of national security.
More important, the problem exists today and will exist well
into the future. Current efforts appear to fix the problems
with surge shipping while letting sustainment shipping slip
toward oblivion. Nonetheless, it is possible, somewhere in
a spectra of political, financial, industrial, and military
tradeoffs, to fix all of the problems related to sealift.
On this matter, recommendations are made in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Problems with sealift related to funding, acquisition,
and operations were plainly displayed by DS/DS. Luckily,
Iraq proved to be a surprisingly weak adversary and
deficiencies in sealift did not lead to the loss of American
lives. Nonetheless, lessons learned point to the need for
reform. Given current trends, reform in the end will equate
only to federal acquisition of more sealift assets and fine-
tuning of some laws and regulations---while not addressing
the related issues of civilian crewing, reemployment rights,
shipbuilding, unfair foreign competition, and many other
issues that affect the economic potential of the maritime
industry. Concerned Americans may ask why the United States
is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually
on national defense, but is not willing to pay the
relatively small cost of keeping a maritime industry that
supports that defense viable (Misch, 1993). One might also
ask why a reserve fleet is maintained at considerable cost
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that is not optimal in composition, condition or readiness.
Hence, the following recommendations are forwarded.
First and foremost, fund sealift in a manner that is
sufficient to meet supply requirements for reasonable
contingencies. Sealift is essential to national defense
objectives. The finest soldiers and equipment in the world
are useless if they cannot be transported to the theater of
conflict in due time.
Second, take steps to halt the decline of the US
Merchant Marine. This is essential. Sustainment sealift
can not be bought, at least in the current climate.
Sustainment shipping has always been the Merchant Marine's
concern and should continue to be. The cost of the military
maintaining these assets will be prohibitive. The capital
requirements to maintain and operate sealift assets for all
contingencies and all levels of mobilization are too great,
even in times of $350 billion annual defense budgets, let
alone today's $260 billion dollar defense budgets. Make
private ownership of ships a worthwhile venture through
changes in the tax code and subsidization. Enact maritime
subsidies that at least double the residual ODS payments of
today to bring them to an inflation-adjusted level of the
early 1980s. Restore CDS subsidies in some form.
Third, continue and expand the building of strategic
sealift ships and devote more assets to prepositioned ships.
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Do not do this to the exclusion of commercial shipping,
especially with respect to sustainment sealift.
Nonetheless, surge shipping requirements are probably best
met with dedicated assets. Continue construction to allay
the crucial shortage in RO/RO vessels. Make some vessels
smaller (less than 600 feet) and faster (with steam plants)
to enhance total operational utility.
Fourth, address manning issues. Do not close the
Merchant Marine Academy. Provide protection to merchant
mariners in times of deployment through salary protection
and reemployment rights. Continue efforts with seafaring
unions to make the shrinking labor pool more reliable.
Fifth, overhaul the National Defense Reserve Forces.
Redistribute the types and numbers of ships in the RRF.
Phase out, rather than increase, breakbulk shipping as part
of the military's overdue shift toward containerization of
applicable cargoes. Establish realistic readiness
categories. Maintain the RRF in a high state of readiness
by continuing programs implemented by MARAD after DS/DS,
especially with respect to maintenance of the fleet.
Eliminate the IRF. It is a drain on valuable resources and
creates a chimera of additional capability.
Finally, and most important, realign contingency
planning for sealift to cover "worst case" scenarios. Do
not assume that foreign shipping will be available for
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sealift, for there are many possible conflicts where the US
would act unilaterally. Do not base strategic planning on
lOO-percent on-time deployment of sealift assets. Lastly,
program adverse possibilities, such as attrition of
shipping, that will no doubt occur against a foe more worthy
than Iraq.
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This established, it is now appropriate to examine this
case for 1999 based on current acquisition plans, which were
detailed in the previous section. Again, only the steam-
driven fast-sealift ships would be capable of making two
trips in the period. The LMSRs, while slightly faster than
the average for the fleet, would still be able to complete
only one transit.
Table 11 displays the result of this analysis. A total
of twenty million square feet of DE capability in this
period is acceptable, The capability exceeds the
requirement, fourteen million square feet, by over forty
percent.
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Test No.3: Sustainment Shipping
DS/DS required a massive amount of sustainment sealift.
As opposed to the surge phase of the operation, in which
shipments consisted mainly of large-sized and wheeled and
tracked cargo (tanks, personnel carriers, mortar
assemblies), the sustainment shipments consisted more of
stores and ammunition. This cargo is necessarily measured
in short tons, not square feet. The sustainment cargo is
slightly more suitable for the merchant fleet, as more of it
can be containerized. This is not to say that DE shipment
stopped after the surge phase of the operation. It is
simply measured in short tons for this portion of the
analysis (a FSS carries 15,000 tons of cargo fully loaded).
Nonetheless, it was a far smaller portion of the total
cargo.
The operational case is now examined. An emplaced
armored division requires 800 tons of cargo per day
(Van Peursem, 1994). The five heavy divisions alone
required 120,000 tons of cargo per month (4,000 tons per day
times 30 days). This does not include the Marines, hospital
units, or army light troops that were also deployed.
Additionally, stockpiles need to be amassed for offensive
operations. Sustainment requirements triple, at least, when
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troops are engaged (Van Peursem, 1994). Given that
offensive operations were imminent when the build-up was
complete at the end of 1990, a reasonable estimate for
required cargo delivery after this point would be 360,000
tons per month (120,000 times three).
Examining sealift deliveries at this point in Table 12,
one notes that deliveries far exceeded the baseline
engagement criteria for the emplaced divisions. In fact,
nearly one million short tons of cargo, over one-fourth of
the total cargo shipped for the operation, was delivered in
January alone. From this comparison, and ultimately, the
success of the mission, one can state that sustainment
sealift was sufficient in DS/DS.
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TABLE 12: SURGE AND SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT IN DS/DS
Month
Surge
Aug./Sep. 90
Sustainment
October 90
November 90
December 90
January 91
February 91
March 91
Total
Source: GAO, 1992
Dry Cargo(short tons)
505,000
434,000
264,000
448,000
910,000
527,000
301,000
3,390,000
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As sealift in the operational case proved sufficient,
there is no need to detail the normative case. Any
improvements in a best-case analysis would, manifestly,
further increase the margin of sufficiency.
This leaves the future case to be examined. Four
primary assumptions are made. First, all government-
administered acquisitions will be complete by 1999. Second,
America's foreign trade merchant fleet will be virtually
extinct by 1999 (Card, 1992c) . All ODS and CDS will have
expired by that point. Barring significant reform of
maritime laws, the merchant fleet will have shrunk to a
brown-water cabotage fleet. Third, activation of the
Sealift Readiness Program or outright requisitioning of US
Merchant Marine assets will not occur, just as it did not
occur during DS/DS, for it would cripple many industries,
including strategic industries, that rely on cabotage.
Finally, foreign shipping will not be available. This is a
reasonable assumption as the next long-range operation may
not be any where near as popular on the international front
as DS/DS. Assuming this comes to pass, sealift becomes an
operation that relies on government assets exclusively.
This begs the question whether government assets, which
comprised 41.1 % of sealift in DS/DS, will be adequate to
sustain an operation of DS/DS's size and geographical
separation in the future.
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For government controlled assets to deliver the whole
sustainment cargo, the carrying capacity shown in DS/DS will
have to increase roughly 130 %. Does the 1999 fleet possess
this capability? The following analysis suggests it does
not.
The analysis shown in Table 13 takes the percentage of
sealift in DS/DS by the various subgroups, and projects
future capability based on changes in capability of the
fleet. This is done with the use of a weighted-average
cargo-carrying multiplier for each subgroup. The multiplier
is relatively straightforward for subgroups where the change
involves ships of the same cargo size and speed. For
instance, the MSC FSSs go from seven converted SL-7s to
eight converted SL-7s. The multiplier in this case is
simple, eight divided by seven, or 1.14. Where different
ship types are introduced, their cargo handling capabilities
and speed must be taken into account . For example, the APS
fleet adds 11 LMSRs to its 12 RO/ROs. The LMSRs have 2.33
times the cargo-carrying capacity (350,000 ft 2 versus
150,000 ft 2 ) , but only 0.71 times the speed capability (24
knots versus 33 knots) of the RO/ROs. The product of these
numbers is weighted on a per-ship basis with the number of
new ships introduced, added to the existing inventory, and
this result is divided by the original inventory to yield
the multiplication factor, or multiplier, in Table 13.
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TABLE 13: SUSTAINMENT SEALIFT, FUTURE CASE
Subgroup DS/DS% DS/DS 1999 Mult. 1999%
MPS 5.2 13 Ro/ROs 13 Ro/ROs 1. 00 5.2
APS 3.7 12 Ro/ROs 12 Ro/ROs 2.52 9.3
11 LMSRs
MSC FSS 10.2 7 FSS 8 FSS 1.14 11. 4
RRF 22.0 17 Ro/RO 27 Ro/RO 1. 82 40.1
7 BARGE 10 BARGE
43 BIB 43 BIB
6 T-ACS 10 T-ACS
9 LMSRs
Total 66.0
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Table 13 shows that sustainment sealift can not be provided
by the surge fleet. Reliance on government assets
exclusively will provide roughly two-thirds of the required
sealift in an operation the scope and size of DS/DS, despite
the vast improvement in government-administered assets.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding analysis yields mixed results. In some
cases, sealift is sufficient, in others, it is not. Table
14 displays the result for each of the cases analyzed.
The operational case in DS/DS shows that while
sustainment shipping was satisfactory, surge sealift assets
were insufficient. Surge shipping was unsuccessful in the
initial stage due to inefficient use of ships. This was
exacerbated by an outright shortage of ships necessary to
complete the surge shipping effort in the required two
months. Sustainment shipping was satisfactory. This
success owed to the availability of foreign shipping, the
existing ability of reserve forces to move cargo, and the
residual capability of the US Merchant Marine.
The analysis of the normative case contains one change
from the operational case. Initial surge delivery of one
heavy division would have been satisfactory if fast-sealift
assets performed up to their capability. It is reasonable
to surmise that operational and administrative improvements
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TABLE 14: RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS- IS SEALIFT SUFFICIENT?
Sealift Time Requirement Operational Normative 1999
Stage
Initial 3 1 Heavy Div No Yes Yes
Surge wks 2.8x10 6 fe
Total 2 5 Heavy Div No1 No Yes
Surge mos 14x10 6 ft 2
Sustainment 1?- yr 3.2x10 6 ft 2 Yes Yes No
lThis case was not analyzed in this study as it was
thoroughly analyzed by Shuford (1990) and portions of the results
were subsequently published (Gibson and Shuford, 1991).
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implemented by MARAD and MSC would in fact bring fast-
sealift capability up to speed. Regardless, the total surge
effort would fall short of the mark. Assets are
insufficient, no matter how they are employed.
Examining the surge portions of the future case yields
some interesting insights. Initial surge capability remains
acceptable from the normative case, although the acquisition
of LMSRs adds nothing due to inherent speed restrictions.
Total surge cargo is reversed from a six million ft 2
shortfall to a similarly sized surplus. This improvement in
fast-sealift assets, by MARAD and MSC, increases the margin
of acceptability by 75%. In fact, it is a step toward the
ability to provide fast-sealift provisions in two regional
conflicts. This capability has been a long-held tenet of
national military policy, unfeasible for at least the last
two decades, that received much attention recently as the
Secretary of Defense proposed scaling it back to a "fight-
hold-fight" policy. From these data, it appears that as far
as surge shipping is required, it is indeed possible for the
government to purchase sufficient assets for its execution.
Sustainment shipping is another matter, however. An
extensive upgrade in the capability of shipping that is
government-owned or leased is not sufficient to stern the
tide of a declining Merchant Marine. This is especially
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true if foreign shipping is not available---a distinct
possibility. In fact, government shipping falls a full
third short the requirements seen in DS/DS. Simply, it is
not practical to buy a fleet for sustainment sealift. The
shipping requirements are too great. Sustainment shipping
must be supplied, at least partially, by its historical
source---the US Merchant Marine.
The results of the analysis, together with the
disturbing points in the literature review, reveal a problem
that is broad in size and scope. The four negative cases in
the analysis support the hypothesis. Even one negative case
is unacceptable from the standpoint of national security.
More important, the problem exists today and will exist well
into the future. Current efforts appear to fix the problems
with surge shipping while letting sustainment shipping slip
toward oblivion. Nonetheless, it is possible, somewhere in
a spectra of political, financial, industrial, and military
tradeoffs, to fix all of the problems related to sealift.
On this matter, recommendations are made in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Problems with sealift related to funding, acquisition,
and operations were plainly displayed by DS/DS . Luckily,
Iraq proved to be a surprisingly weak adversary and
deficiencies in sealift did not lead to the loss of American
lives. Nonetheless, lessons learned point to the need for
reform. Given current trends, reform in the end will equate
only to federal acquisition of more sealift assets and fine-
tuning of some laws and regulations---while not addressing
the related issues of civilian crewing, reemployment rights,
shipbuilding, unfair foreign competition, and many other
issues that affect the economic potential of the maritime
industry. Concerned Americans may ask why the United States
is willing to spend hundreds of billions of dollars annually
on national defense, but is not willing to pay the
relatively small cost of keeping a maritime industry that
supports that defense viable (Misch, 1993). One might also
ask why a reserve fleet is maintained at considerable cost
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that is not optimal in composition, condition or readiness.
Hence, the following recommendations are forwarded.
First and foremost, fund sealift in a manner that is
sufficient to meet supply requirements for reasonable
contingencies. Sealift is essential to national defense
objectives. The finest soldiers and equipment in the world
are useless if they cannot be transported to the theater of
conflict in due time.
Second, take steps to halt the decline of the US
Merchant Marine. This is essential. Sustainment sealift
can not be bought, at least in the current climate.
Sustainment shipping has always been the Merchant Marine's
concern and should continue to be. The cost of the military
maintaining these assets will be prohibitive. The capital
requirements to maintain and operate sealift assets for all
contingencies and all levels of mobilization are too great,
even in times of $350 billion annual defense budgets, let
alone today's $260 billion dollar defense budgets. Make
private ownership of ships a worthwhile venture through
changes in the tax code and subsidization. Enact maritime
subsidies that at least double the residual ODS payments of
today to bring them to an inflation-adjusted level of the
early 1980s. Restore CDS subsidies in some form.
Third, continue and expand the building of strategic
sealift ships and devote more assets to prepositioned ships.
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Do not do this to the exclusion of commercial shipping,
especially with respect to sustainment sealift.
Nonetheless, surge shipping requirements are probably best
met with dedicated assets. Continue construction to allay
the crucial shortage in RO/RO vessels. Make some vessels
smaller (less than 600 feet) and faster (with steam plants)
to enhance total operational utility.
Fourth, address manning issues. Do not close the
Merchant Marine Academy. Provide protection to merchant
mariners in times of deployment through salary protection
and reemployment rights. Continue efforts with seafaring
unions to make the shrinking labor pool more reliable.
Fifth, overhaul the National Defense Reserve Forces.
Redistribute the types and numbers of ships in the RRF.
Phase out, rather than increase, breakbulk shipping as part
of the military's overdue shift toward containerization of
applicable cargoes. Establish realistic readiness
categories. Maintain the RRF in a high state of readiness
by continuing programs implemented by MARAD after DS/DS,
especially with respect to maintenance of the fleet.
Eliminate the IRF. It is a drain on valuable resources and
creates a chimera of additional capability.
Finally, and most important, realign contingency
planning for sealift to cover "worst case" scenarios. Do
not assume that foreign shipping will be available for
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sealift, for there are many possible conflicts where the US
would act unilaterally. Do not base strategic planning on
lOO-percent on-time deployment of sealift assets. Lastly,
program adverse possibilities, such as attrition of
shipping, that will no doubt occur against a foe more worthy
than Iraq.
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